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The Most Technologically Progressive Decade of the Century
By ALEXANDER J. FIELD*
Because of the Depression’s place in both the
popular and academic imagination, and the re-
peated and justifiable emphasis on output that
was not produced, income that was not earned,
and expenditure that did not take place, it will
seem startling to propose the following hypoth-
esis: the years 1929–1941 were, in the aggre-
gate, the most technologically progressive of
any comparable period in U.S. economic history.1
The hypothesis entails two primary claims: that
during this period businesses and government
contractors implemented or adopted on a more
widespread basis a wide range of new technol-
ogies and practices, resulting in the highest rate
of measured peacetime peak-to-peak multifac-
tor productivity growth in the century, and sec-
ondly, that the Depression years produced
advances that replenished and expanded the lar-
der of unexploited or only partially exploited
techniques, thus providing the basis for much of
the labor and multifactor productivity improve-
ment of the 1950’s and 1960’s.
The hypothesis does not imply that all of the
effects of the advances registered in the decade
were immediately felt in the productivity data,
nor, on the other hand, does it dismiss the sig-
nificance of larder-stocking during the 1920’s
and earlier, upon which measured advance
built. Rather, it draws our attention to the prob-
ability that progress in invention and innovation
in the 1930’s was significant, in ways not well
appreciated, both in facilitating the remarkable
U.S. economic performance before and during
World War II, and in establishing foundations
for the prosperity of the 1950’s and 1960’s.
I. Output Growth, Input Growth, and the
Productivity Data
The starting point for this exploration is mac-
roeconomic data on real output growth, labor
force growth, and the growth of the real capital
stock, series that underlie our conclusions about
trends in labor productivity and multifactor pro-
ductivity growth. Major contributors to the con-
struction, adjustment, and interpretation of
these data have included Edward Denison, John
Kendrick, Dale Jorgenson, Zvi Griliches, Rob-
ert Solow, Moses Abramovitz, Paul David, and
Robert J. Gordon. Of these, only the last three
have attempted systematic historically informed
overviews of the twentieth century as a whole.
There is now an emerging consensus that, look-
ing back over the course of U.S. history, the
period between roughly 1905 and 1966 experi-
enced exceptionally high rates of multifactor
productivity growth, substantially higher than
those evidenced in the decades preceding and
following, when a much higher fraction of la-
bor productivity growth is to be attributed sim-
ply to capital deepening (Abramovitz and
David, 1999, 2000; Gordon, 1999, 2000a, b, c).
Within that plateau, the highest rates of MFP
growth appear to have occurred in the second
quarter of the century. Although the question
of when within the 1905–1966 period peak
MFP growth took place was not central to their
research agenda, Abramovitz and David did
conclude that it happened in advance of mid-
century: “Before allowing for the vintage effect,
the rate of refined TFP growth from 1948 to
1966 stands higher than that from 1929 to 1948.
Allowing for the vintage effect, the reverse
seems to have been true” (2000, p. 29).2 Gordon
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1 The reference in the title to a decade reflects poetic
license: my interest here is in a 12-year period. See Broadus
Mitchell (1947) for precedent.
2 See Table 1. Abramovitz and David’s principal inter-
pretive emphasis was on the contrast between economic
growth based on the accumulation of physical capital in the
nineteenth century and the knowledge based growth of the
twentieth century. The terms total factor productivity (TFP)
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has zeroed in more intensively on the mid-
century chronology, but his interpretations pose
challenges because his narrative (and numbers)
have changed somewhat in his most recent pub-
lications.3 In his latest work, however, he con-
tinues to emphasize, consonant with the
Abramovitz/David view, that “In the United
States, in comparison to Japan and Europe, a
substantial part of the great leap in the level of
multifactor productivity had already occurred
by the end of World War II” (Gordon, 2000b,
p. 22).
Both the Abramovitz/David and the Gordon
analyses draw our attention to high and accel-
erating MFP growth in the second quarter of the
century (see Table 1). It was the data underlying
what was then recent economic history that so
surprised Robert Solow in his 1957 analysis for
which, in part, he received the Nobel prize.
Solow’s work contributed to the development
of the concept of the residual and its interpre-
tation: since real output was growing much
faster than could be explained by the growth of
inputs conventionally measured, he (as did
Abramovitz and others) suggested that the un-
explained growth should be identified statisti-
cally with the contribution of a number of
factors, the most important of which was tech-
nical change. Solow’s seminal article was, how-
ever, published more than forty years ago.
Between 1972 and 1995 Solow’s residual
and, indeed, the multifactor productivity growth
to which it gives rise, all but vanished. It is true
that labor productivity continued to grow, albeit
at a markedly slower rate, but a very high per-
centage of this can be attributed to capital deep-
ening, which continued at a slower rate than
was true in the 1950’s and 1960’s in part be-
cause of an upward trend in hours per worker.
Still, to the degree that labor productivity has
advanced in recent years, it has, with the excep-
tion of a few years at the end of the 1990’s,
done so the old-fashioned way—through sacri-
fice of current consumption so that physical
capital goods (mostly structures and equipment)
could be piled up at a faster rate than the growth
of labor hours. Thus the economic history of the
last three decades of the twentieth century has
recapitulated in the United States a pattern ev-
ident in the late nineteenth century, but quite
markedly absent during the second quarter of
the twentieth century, and more generally over
the five-to-six decade period prior to the
mid-1960’s.
The 1929–1948 period (I discuss the choice
of beginning and end points below) is critical in
understanding the long-term trajectory of tech-
nical change in the United States, both because
of its direct effect on growth during the period
and because of its lagged effect on MFP ad-
vance in the 1950’s which, when coupled with
renewed capital deepening, produced a golden
age of labor productivity growth and living
standard improvement. If we are to put in per-
spective U.S. accomplishments over the past
half century, we need to understand what hap-
pened prior to mid-century to place the Ameri-
can economy in the position of world
dominance it enjoyed after the war. Partly, of
course, this involved wartime devastation in
Europe and Japan. But partly, it must have
reflected the extraordinarily high rates of MFP
growth over the second quarter of the century in
the United States, and the question on this ac-
count comes down to how much of this was the
direct result of wartime experience, and how
and multifactor productivity (MFP) are used interchange-
ably in this paper.
3 See below for discussion of the implications of this
evolving narrative for the thesis of this paper.
TABLE 1—COMPOUND ANNUAL AVERAGE GROWTH RATES
OF PRIVATE NONFARM MFP, UNITED STATES, 1870–1996
Abramovitz/David, 1999 Gordon, 2000b
1870–1891 0.39
1890–1905 1.28 1891–1913 1.14
1905–1927 1.38 1913–1928 1.42
1929–1948 1.54 1928–1950 1.90
1948–1966 1.31 1950–1964 1.47
1964–1972 0.89
1966–1989 0.04 1972–1979 0.16
1979–1988 0.59
1988–1996 0.79
Notes: The Abramovitz-David capital input estimates in-
clude an adjustment for vintage effects, based on the pre-
sumption that more recently installed capital embodies
unmeasured quality improvements (see text). Their output
series includes housing services and their input series in-
cludes the housing capital stock, in contrast to Gordon’s,
which exclude housing in both numerator and denominator.
Gordon’s data are before his adjustments for the composi-
tion and quantity of labor and capital; for discussion of these
adjustments, see text.
Sources: Abramovitz/David: 1999, Table 1:IVA; Gordon:
2000b, Table 1, p. 28.
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much is to be attributed to prior peacetime ad-
vances, particularly those achieved through
1941, both in measured productivity advance
and in larder stocking.
A. Two Stories
This paper is concerned specifically with
what happened between 1929 and 1948, and
when, and more particularly, with whether the
bulk of multifactor productivity advance over
the period had already been achieved before full
scale U.S. mobilization in 1942. Two compet-
ing hypotheses may be suggested with respect
to this record. Either the growth in MFP is
primarily attributable to an exceptional concat-
enation of technical advances across a broad
frontier of the American economy during the
1930’s, building on unexploited opportunities at
the end of the 1920’s, or it is principally the
consequence of the production experience of
World War II: a persisting benefit of the enor-
mous cumulated output as well perhaps of
spinoffs from war related R&D. For the latter
hypothesis, the explanation of how we got
where we were by the end of the 1940’s, to
make reference to a classic article by Arrow, is
principally that the economy was one large
C-47 factory, permanently reaping the gains
from wartime learning by doing (Kenneth Ar-
row, 1962; Armen Alchian, 1963).
Certainly, the war experience left us with
advances in such areas as radar, metal working
and materials science, microwave technology,
aeronautics, and atomic energy, as well as ad-
ditional experience in producing large quanti-
ties of aircraft, ships, aviation fuel, synthetic
rubber, aluminum, and ordnance. Most of the
growth accounting studies deal with non-farm
output, but we might add that the expansion of
munitions plants led to a permanent decline in
the real price of fertilizer in the postwar period,
benefiting agriculture (Alan Olmstead and Paul
Rhode, 2000, p. 710).
Whether these advances were, in the aggre-
gate, more significant in accounting for the level
of output and productivity achieved by 1948
than those already attained by 1941, or whose
foundations were in place by that point, is a
question that has not heretofore been asked. The
alternative hypothesis is that the preponderance
of gains, both in the achievement of higher
measured productivity levels and in the expan-
sion of the larder, had already been attained by
the outbreak of war, and indeed helped make
possible its successful prosecution. This then
implies that throughout the Depression, behind
the dramatic backdrop of continued high unem-
ployment, technological and organizational in-
novations were occurring across the American
economy, especially but not exclusively in
chemical engineering (including petrochemicals
and synthetic rubber), aeronautics, electrical
machinery and equipment, electric power gen-
eration and distribution, transportation, commu-
nication, and civil/structural engineering, that
these trends have something to do with the
rising real wages during this period of those
who managed to stay employed, and that the
sum total of these changes had, by the onset of
World War II, increased the natural or potential
output of the U.S. economy far beyond what
contemporary observers and economists at the
time believed possible. Some of these develop-
ments involved entirely new products, not just
process improvements in the production of
goods already in the market.
II. The U.S. Achievement During the Second
World War
There are several related reasons why econ-
omists have been inclined to attribute achieved
productivity levels in 1948 to the experience of
the war.4 First, the sheer volume of military and
total output produced between 1942 and 1945
was indeed remarkable. Second, there were ex-
traordinary achievements in particular sectors,
most notably airframes and shipbuilding. Be-
tween the first quarter of 1942 and the last
quarter of 1944, for example, airframe produc-
tion increased by a factor of six, and labor
productivity grew by 160 percent. Similarly in
shipbuilding: in one ten-month period alone, the
number of hours required to build a Victory ship
fell by half (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
1946, pp. 897–98).
4 William J. Baumol wrote in 1986 that “... except in
wartime, for the better part of a century, U.S. productivity
growth rates have been low ...” (Baumol, 1986, p. 1073).
His comment, although within the context of an interna-
tional comparison, reflects a widespread belief that twenti-
eth century wars, and particularly the Second World War,
have been relatively favorable influences on U.S. produc-
tivity growth.
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These successes, however, need to be kept in
perspective. The War Production Board esti-
mated that the overall increase in output per
hour in the munitions industries was about 25
percent for the 1939–1944 period: certainly re-
spectable, but far below the increases registered
in standout sectors. Looking back on the war
from the perspective of 1949, Jules Backman
and M. R. Gainsbrugh concluded that the over-
all experience in the military sector “again re-
veals the extreme difficulties of securing
‘miraculous’ gains in productivity in any short
term period” (1949, pp. 179–80).
And the period was relatively short. The
United States declared war on Japan and Ger-
many in December of 1941, but it took time to
formulate and agree on war production plans,
pass budgets, and cut contracts. It was well into
1942 before the economy was on anything like
a full scale war footing (Michael Edelstein,
2000). So we are talking about a period of a
little more than three years for the putative
effects of learning by doing to have established
the foundations for postwar prosperity.
As far as spillovers, there is at least as much
evidence of transfer from civilian experience to
military production during the war as there is
for feedback in the other direction afterwards.
The successes in planes and ships, for example,
for the most part represented, in conjunction
with massive government funded infusions of
plant and equipment, the application to the pro-
duction of military hardware of organizational
techniques that had been pioneered in the man-
ufacture of radios, vacuum cleaners, and auto-
mobiles (W. D. Evans, 1947, p. 217). Aside
from advances in welding techniques, technol-
ogies for working with light metals such as
aluminum, and radar (U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, 1946), which benefited the commer-
cial aircraft industry after the war, as well as the
aforementioned drop in fertilizer prices, there is
relatively limited evidence of beneficial feed-
back from wartime production to civilian activ-
ity in the postwar period.5
On balance, the war was detrimental to
productivity growth in the civilian sector. It
drained skilled workers, managers, and plant
and equipment investment from these indus-
tries, creating a productivity shortfall that had
to be made up afterwards. A 1946 Bureau of
Labor Statistics study demonstrates that while
output per hour in nonmunitions industries
continued to grow through 1939, 1940, and
1941, it declined in 1942 and 1943 before
leveling off in 1944 and increasing in 1945
(U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1946, p.
899). There was thus little net gain over the
war years. This should be contrasted with a
trajectory of rapid gains that might otherwise
have persisted through the first half of the
1940’s.
Finally, even setting aside the well known
difficulties in valuing wartime output (Robert
Higgs, 1992), part of the apparent increase
in output per hour was the consequence of
the shift of output towards sectors which
had traditionally experienced higher value
added per worker. Labor productivity for the
economy as a whole would have increased
as a consequence of this reallocation alone
even if there had been no improvement in
productive efficiency in any individual sec-
tor (see Evans, 1947). This effect, however,
could not persist: it had to reverse itself with
demobilization, and the return to a less goods-
intensive more consumer-oriented production
set (U.S. War Production Board, 1945).
For all of these reasons there are grounds for
doubting that the production experience of the
Second World War was principally responsible
for achieved productivity levels in 1948.
III. Why 1941? Why 1948? Kendrick’s Data
and the Importance of Peak-to-Peak
Comparisons
Perhaps the most critical imperative in anal-
yses of productivity trends is that comparisons
be made between years in which the economy is
at similar stages of the business cycle. In the
expansion phase of a cycle, as output increases,
input hours go up, but often only with a lag.
Cyclical recovery, in and of itself, will com-
monly lead to an acceleration in productivity
growth rates that slows as the expansion nears
its end, and a measurement from trough to peak,
for example, may tell us little about long-term
5 The influence of atomic power on productivity in the
electric power generating sector proved eventually a mixed
blessing, although a full discussion of the case is beyond the
scope of this paper. The crash program for the development of
techniques for the mass production of penicillin obviously had
persisting benefits from the standpoint of public health (David
Mowery and Nathan Rosenberg, 2000, p. 819).
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trends.6 The most straightforward way to avoid
the contamination of cyclical effects is to
choose business-cycle peaks for both beginning
and end points of a comparison.
Putting the rule into practice, however, is not
always a simple matter. The emphasis in this
paper on the technological progressivity of the
Depression years would appear to conflict with
Kendrick’s well-known conclusion that al-
though private domestic economy MFP grew at
a rate of 2 percent per year between 1919 and
1929, it did so at only 1.6 percent per year
between 1929 and 1937 (Kendrick, 1961, p. 72).
Given the conventional emphasis on the boom
of the 1920’s and its contrast with the disastrous
macroeconomic performance in the 1930’s, we
might be inclined to accept this differential and
move on to more interesting matters.
The problem is that Kendrick compared a
fully employed economy in 1929 (3.2 percent
unemployment) with a 1937 economy in which
14.3 percent of the labor force (9.2 percent
according to Michael Darby, 1976) was still out
of work. Although large firms were doing well,
thousands of medium and smaller ones were
not. If we seek a peacetime peak-to-peak com-
parison, we are better served by choosing as an
endpoint 1941, when unemployment, although
still averaging 9.9 percent (6 percent according
to Darby), was closer to what it was in 1929, but
before war spending or production could seri-
ously have influenced the economy.
The choice of 1941 warrants further discus-
sion given the two hypotheses developed above.
It is true that a military buildup in anticipation
of the Second World War had begun by 1941, a
year in which federal military spending for re-
armament, expansion of uniformed personnel,
Lend Lease and other programs totaled $6.3
billion. This represented about 5 percent of
1941 U.S. GNP, and both total military spend-
ing and active duty military (1.8 million) were
more than triple what they had been in 1940
(Stanley Lebergott, 1964, Table A-3, pp. 512–
13; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1975).
This increased government spending un-
doubtedly contributed to higher employment
and output levels before the war, through stan-
dard multiplier mechanisms (J. R. Vernon,
1994). But cumulated military procurement was
still minor compared to what would follow.
Total federal military spending reached $22.9
billion in 1942, $63.4 billion in 1943, $76.0
billion in 1944, and $80.5 billion in 1945, when
active duty military peaked at 12.1 million
(Lebergott, 1964; U.S. Bureau of the Census,
1975). By the end of 1941, only a small fraction
(2.5 percent) of the $249.1 billion total military
spending occurring between 1941 and 1945 in-
clusive had already been undertaken.
There would have had to have been ex-
tremely rapid spillovers from public to private
production for the war build up to have affected
private sector productivity by this date through
any mechanism other than bringing the econ-
omy closer to full employment. It seems diffi-
cult, therefore, to credit achieved productivity
levels in 1941 to the effect of new management
techniques learned, or new technologies discov-
ered, as the result of cumulated war production.
1940, on the other hand, is a poor candidate for
a peacetime peak, since unemployment (14.6
percent) was actually higher than it had been in
1937. 1941 is therefore our best bet if we wish
to differentiate between the two hypotheses set
forth above.
In contrast to the work of recent students of
productivity change, Kendrick’s 1961 book in-
cludes detailed appendices providing annual
measures, in levels, of inputs, outputs, and pro-
ductivity indexes.7 It is thus particularly useful
in addressing the issues of timing raised in this
paper. Using his data (Commerce version), I
calculate a compound annual average growth
rate of private domestic economy MFP of 2.27
percent per year between 1929 and 1941. In
contrast, MFP grows at 1.51 percent per year
between 1941 and 1948. The differential is even
more striking for the private nonfarm economy
(see Table 2). (Kendrick, 1961, Tables A-XXII,
A-XXIII, pp. 334–35; 339–40).8
6 The argument is usually made for labor input, but one
can make a similar claim for capital during the 1930’s; this
effect (very slow capital input growth) is one reason for the
remarkable surge in the output-capital ratio, and thus capital
productivity, during these years.
7 Annual BLS data on multifactor productivity is avail-
able beginning only in 1948; see www.bls.gov. Neither
Abramovitz/David nor Gordon includes the type of detailed
annual data available in Kendrick, although both acknowl-
edge their debt to him.
8 One of the differences between the Gordon and the
Abramovitz/David chronology is that Gordon uses 1950 as
a reference peak, as opposed to 1948. It is not clear why.
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It is interesting in this light to reread Solow’s
1957 article, which examined annual data for
the years 1909 through 1949. The interpretation
of his work has generally focused on the small
fraction of improvements in output per hour that
can be attributed to capital deepening over this
period. To my knowledge, his numbers have
rarely been examined with an eye to compara-
tive MFP growth rates within the four decades
he looked at. It is striking, in this regard, and not
entirely coincidental, to observe that the pattern
evident in Kendrick’s data for the entire private
domestic economy was also apparent, in more
extreme form, in Solow’s original article. Solow
intended his analysis (much of it based on Ken-
drick’s preliminary data) as only a first cut. But
he did note that with respect to total factor
productivity, “there does seem to be a break at
about 1930. There is some evidence that the
average rate of progress in the years 1909–29
was smaller than that from 1930–49” (Solow,
1957, p. 316). Although he did not use his data
to examine growth within the latter period, they
suggest (see Table 2) that MFP growth was
much higher between 1929 and 1941 as com-
pared with 1941–1948.
IV. Adjustments to the Capital Input Series
Although Gordon, in contrast to Abramovitz/
David, has repeatedly drawn attention to the
extraordinary midcentury productivity record,
his work poses special interpretive challenges
because of the evolving character of his narra-
tive. In his original emphasis on “one big
wave,” Gordon identified the 1928–1950 period
as evidencing peak MFP growth, and it is this
chronology that he featured in three editions of
his macroeconomics textbook, beginning in
1993 and extending through the eighth edition
published in 2000 (Gordon, 2000a, Table 10-
1, p. 323). More recently he has made adjust-
ments to both capital and labor input that tip the
balance in favor of his 1950–1964 period (in
Gordon, 2000b, adjusted MFP growth is 1.13
percent per year for the latter years and 1.05 for
1928–1950; see Table 7, p. 51).
It is important to understand what drives this
switch in the top two MFP growth periods.
Gordon’s adjustments to labor input are
straightforward and similar to those made by
others: they create an “augmented” input series
that takes into account the changing educational
and demographic characteristics of the work-
force. These changes have almost no impact on
comparative MFP growth, however, because
they boost “effective” labor input growth by
almost the same amount (0.5 vs. 0.4 percentage
points per year) during the two periods.
Nor is the switch in peak MFP growth peri-
ods due to the adjustment to capital input for the
increasing importance of equipment. Following
Jorgenson, Gordon argues that the service flow
from equipment tends to be higher because of
its higher annual depreciation rates. Thus using
net capital stock data to proxy for service flow
will understate capital input growth if the equip-
ment share is rising. This adjustment, however,
operates in favor of the 1928–1950 period,
since it increases capital input growth 0.85 per-
centage points per year between 1950 and 1964
as opposed to only 0.68 percentage points per
year between 1928 and 1950.
The toppling of 1928–1950 as the highest
MFP growth period in Gordon’s latest chronol-
ogy is in fact entirely driven by the “Gordon
quantity adjustment”—unique to the author—
which boosts the compound annual average
growth rate of capital input by 0.96 percentage
points between 1928 and 1950, while reducing
Unemployment in 1948 was 3.8 percent, vs. 5.2 percent in
1950. Output peaked in 1948: Q4; and the year remains a
peak in labor productivity, even after series are cyclically
adjusted (Peter Clark, 1978). On a variety of dimensions
1948 appears to be a superior year for a peacetime peak-to-
peak comparison, and I follow Abramovitz and David in
using it. Gordon’s reasons for preferring 1928 to 1929 are
similarly unclear: both the output peak and the unemploy-
ment trough occur in the latter year, although 1928 unem-
ployment, at 4.2 percent, was closer to the 3.8 percent of
1948 than was the 3.2 percent of 1929.
TABLE 2—COMPOUND ANNUAL AVERAGE GROWTH RATES
OF MFP, UNITED STATES, 1919–1948
Solow
(Private
nonfarm
economy)
Kendrick
(Private
domestic
economy)
Kendrick
(Private
nonfarm
economy)
1919–1929 0.78 1.97 2.02
1929–1941 2.36 2.27 2.31
1941–1948 0.89 1.51 1.29
Sources: Solow, 1957, Table 1, p. 315; Kendrick, 1961,
Tables A-22, A-24, pp. 334–35, 339–40.
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it 0.45 percentage points between 1950 and
1964.9 It is scarcely surprising that such a large
difference in the adjustment to input growth
rates during the two periods reverses their rel-
ative dominance in terms of MFP growth.
The adjustment has three components. The
first is the inclusion of street and highway cap-
ital. As argued below, there is good reason to
believe that such capital is complementary to
private sector capital in industries such as truck-
ing, housing, and wholesale and retail distribu-
tion. Including it works, nevertheless, in favor
of 1928–1950, because street and highway cap-
ital grew faster between 1950–1964 than it did
over the earlier period (compound annual aver-
age growth rate of 4.61 percent vs. 2.99 percent;
see U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Fixed
Asset Table 7.2, line 10).10
The second adjustment, which does favor
1950–1964, is for government owned, privately
operated (GOPO) capital, which grew rapidly
between 1940 and 1945. During the war Wash-
ington funded the construction of large plants
for the atomic bomb project (government
owned, government operated). But it also used
billions of dollars of taxpayer money to build
structures and pay for equipment (especially
machine tools) in a number of other industries
critical to the war effort, including synthetic
rubber, airframes and engines, aviation fuel re-
fining, and aluminum production (U.S. Recon-
struction Finance Corporation, 1946). These
plants were owned by the government, operated
by private firms during the war, and sold off to
the private sector in its aftermath.
For decades Gordon has rightly insisted that
we acknowledge the economic importance of
these assets (Gordon, 1969). The increase in
GOPO capital between 1940 and 1948, how-
ever, is too small in relation to overall private
sector capital stocks to account for the reversal
in peak MFP periods. It is, moreover, counter-
balanced almost exactly, in terms of its impact
on comparative MFP growth in the two periods,
by the effect of including street and highway
capital (see Gordon, 2000b, Table 5).11
Finally, and most problematically, Gordon
adjusts for variable retirement rates. The con-
ventional Kendrick/BEA input series assume
constant asset lives for each class. In making
this adjustment, Gordon assumes instead that
retirement rates varied directly with gross in-
vestment (Gordon, 2000b, pp. 42–45), so that
during the 1928–1950 period, when there was
relatively little investment, structures and
equipment were kept in service longer than
would otherwise have been the case. As a con-
sequence, adjusted capital input in 1950, he
argues, is much higher than the standard series
suggest.
There is little dispute that the average age of
capital increased over the 1928–1950 period,
and declined between 1950 and 1964, and that
these changes were quite substantial (see U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis, Fixed Asset Ta-
bles 6.9, 6.10). It is commonly assumed, how-
ever, that newer assets are more likely to
contain unmeasured or poorly measured quality
improvements. If the average age of assets in-
creased over the second quarter of the century,
the contribution to capital input growth of un-
measured quality improvements would have de-
clined. This indeed is the rationale for the
vintage adjustment made by Abramovitz and
David, which in their analysis reduces capital
input growth by 0.11 percentage points per year
between 1929 and 1948, while increasing it by
0.16 percentage points per year between 1948
and 1966 (Abramovitz and David, 1999, Table
1: IVA). Gordon notes, but does not adjust for,
9 There are some inconsistencies between Tables 5 and 6
in Gordon, 2000b. The numbers reported above are based
on the sum of columns 5, 6, and 7 in Table 5 for the two
respective time intervals. For 1928–1950, this is very close
to what one gets by subtracting column 5 from column 6 in
Table 6, although there is a considerable difference (0.27
vs. 0.45) when one attempts this for 1950–1964. I rely on
Table 5 because it presents a more detailed breakdown of
the components of the capital quantity adjustment.
10 This is reflected in Gordon, 2000b, Table 5, column 7.
11 Gordon’s GOPO adjustment is apparently based on
the data on line 28 of Table 7.2 of the BEA’s Fixed Asset
Tables (the source notes in Gordon, 2000b, in this instance
are opaque). It is not clear, however, whether the BEA’s
valuations for the postwar period reflect the cost of replace-
ment for the original use or for the use to which the assets
may have been put following demobilization. There remains
an unresolved dispute over the usefulness for civilian pro-
duction of this capital after the war. Some have criticized
the transfers to the private sector as sweetheart deals; the
valuations reflected in the sales, however, have been de-
fended on the grounds that substantial retrofitting was often
required to make them suitable for civilian production. To
the degree that defenders of the postwar sales have a point,
the adjustment for GOPO capital that Gordon has included
may be somewhat too large, and artificially inflate capital
input for 1950.
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the likelihood of unmeasured improvements in
capital quality (Gordon, 2000b, p. 42). There is
some irony here, given the emphasis he has
given the issue elsewhere.
His adjustment for variable lifetimes also de-
pends on the assumption that annual service
flow remains uniform throughout the life of an
asset. If structures and equipment were retained
in service longer than normal during the De-
pression and war years, service flow could well
have declined as a consequence, with the equiv-
alent of chewing gum and baling wire allowing
the continued operation of depreciated assets.12
The impact of an older capital stock on ser-
vice flow has at least three components. In a
relatively arbitrary fashion, Gordon has made
an imputation for one of them, without attempt-
ing to account for the counterbalancing effects
of the other two. For this reason we should
approach these latest adjusted estimates with
caution. Although the dust has not yet settled,
my expectation is that we will ultimately accept
the broad ranking of peak MFP growth periods
emerging from Abramovitz/David, as well as
the earlier Gordon work, as the more appropri-
ate one. The 1999 revisions of the National
Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), which
result in an upward revision of the 1929–1948
output growth rates, reinforce this conclusion.
V. Micro-Level and Sectoral Analysis
The macroeconomic evidence that the fastest
rate of multifactor productivity growth over the
last century and a half, and probably two cen-
turies, took place in the 1929–1941 period is
consistent with a variety of evidence at the
micro level. Alfred Kleinknecht’s study of
product and process innovations from 1850 to
1969 provides a data set on fundamental inno-
vations, divided into product, process, instru-
mentation, and other. The peak for the total and
two of the four components is in the 1930’s, and
is particularly marked for product innovations
(Kleinknecht, 1987, p. 66). Jacob Schmookler’s
1966 enumeration of basic and improvement
innovations shows a similar peak in the 1930’s,
particularly its second half, as does the chronol-
ogy provided by Gerhard Mensch (1979, pp. 132).
These studies have often been ignored in mac-
roeconomic inquiry, in part because their results
seem so at variance with our impressions of the
economic “success” of the Depression years.
These patterns, along with the aggregate data,
are also consistent with David Mowery’s study
of research and development (R&D) expendi-
tures and employment in U.S. manufacturing.
National Research Council data show that be-
tween 1919 and 1928 inclusive, companies
founded an average of 66 R&D labs per year.
Between 1929 and 1936 inclusive, a period that
brackets the worst years of the Depression, 73
on average were founded per year. During the
1930’s, industry R&D expenditures more than
doubled in real terms, with acceleration in the
last years of the decade (Mowery and Rosen-
berg, 1989, p. 69; see also Esther Fano, 1987, p.
262). Mowery reports that employment of re-
search scientists and engineers grew 72.9 per-
cent between 1929–1933 while employment
totals in other occupational categories col-
lapsed. Between 1933 and 1940, R&D employ-
ment in U.S. manufacturing almost tripled,
from 10,918 to 27,777. In the Second World
War, in contrast, research and development em-
ployment growth slowed as employment in
other categories skyrocketed. Federal spending
for nondefense R&D also fell substantially dur-
ing World War II (Mowery and Rosenberg,
2000, pp. 814, 819).
Within manufacturing, advance took place
across a variety of fronts (Michael Bernstein,
1987, especially Ch. 4). There were, to be
sure, older industries such as textiles, leather
goods, and apparel, where productivity
growth was slow or nonexistent. But there
were also a remarkable number of dynamic
sectors, generating new process and product
innovations, with varying levels of commer-
cial exploitation before the war. Petrochemi-
cals is an obvious example. At companies
such as Dupont, advances in chemical engi-
neering generated a host of new products,
including Lucite (sold as Plexiglas by a rival
manufacturer), Teflon, and Nylon (Peter H.
Spitz, 1988; Stephen Fenichel, 1996). Even in
an older industry such as automobiles, in-
novation and product quality improvement
during the decade proceeded at a rapid
rate. Indeed, Daniel M. G. Raff and Manuel
Trajtenberg (1997) view the decade as the last
12 There are still 1959 Chevrolets operating on the streets
of Havana, but most would agree that the equipment is not
providing the same service flow it did four decades ago.
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one in which there were truly revolutionary
improvements in internal combustion engine
powered vehicles.
But progress was not limited to manufactur-
ing: communications services, electric utilities,
and transportation were also standouts. MFP
growth in the telephone industry accelerated
significantly after 1929 before falling precipi-
tously during the war years. In electric utilities,
MFP growth more than doubled comparing
1929–1941 with 1919–1929; in contrast to the
telephone case, high rates persisted after 1941
(see Table 3).
The railroad sector, which dominated the
economy at the end of the nineteenth century in
a way no single sector has before or since,
continued to figure prominently in the second
quarter of the twentieth. In 1941 railroad fixed
capital still comprised more than one out of
every four dollars (26.9 percent) of U.S. private
fixed nonresidential assets (U.S. Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis, Fixed Asset Table 2.1). Labor
productivity in railroads grew much more dra-
matically during the 1930’s than it had in the
1920’s, and as Spurgeon Bell wrote in 1940, “In
the twenties, the increase was largely due to
new capital investment, in the thirties to orga-
nizational economies” (Bell, 1940, p. 64).
Bell’s analysis is consistent with Kendrick’s
data (see Table 3). The strong MFP growth
between 1929 and 1941 takes place in the con-
text of a capital input series in railroads that
declines after 1931. We see here at the sectoral
level a major contributor to the unusual rise in
the aggregate output-capital ratio during the De-
pression years (Kendrick, Table G-III, pp. 544–
45; on manufacturing, see Bernstein, 1987, pp.
112–20).
The 1930’s also witnessed advances in struc-
tural engineering, particularly improved tech-
niques for utilizing concrete in conjunction with
steel in bridge, tunnel, dam, and highway de-
sign.13 Perhaps of even greater importance, the
decade saw the working out of a paradigm for
building infrastructure suitable for an age of
automobiles and trucks, with implications for
the spatial configuration as well as design and
construction of roads, highways, bridges,
wholesale and retail distribution facilities, and
residential subdivisions. Much of the develop-
ment work on these principles was done during
the 1930’s under the aegis of the newly formed
Federal Housing Authority and diffused
throughout the United States after the Second
World War through the efforts of this agency in
conjunction with local zoning authorities.
A large portion of the infrastructure required
for economically successful postwar housing
construction was put in place during the 1930’s,
as the consequence of the use of public funds to
improve the road transport system. During the
1920’s, infrastructure, particularly streets and
highways, did not keep up with the burgeoning
sales of private vehicles. Public expenditures
during the 1930’s substantially remedied this, in
a manner that impacted the productivity of the
housing sector as well as that of the economy as
a whole.
Due to network effects, the design improve-
ments in conjunction with infrastructural invest-
ment generated a boost in output in housing
beyond what can be swept back to the value of
the physical capital formation itself. Edward F.
Denison’s data show a surge in the real value of
the service flow from the housing sector begin-
ning in 1940 (Denison, 1974, Figure 3.1, p. 20).
This may be partially attributable to a reduction
in the vacancy rate, as Denison suggests, but it
also coincides with the sharp increase in the
streets and highways capital stock during the
Depression (see Table 4). After the war the
increase in the real service flow from the hous-
ing stock continued apace, reflecting not only
13 The Hoover Dam, George Washington, Golden Gate,
and Oakland Bay Bridges, Lincoln Tunnel, Pennsylvania
Turnpike, Merritt Parkway and Pasadena Freeway are no-
table achievements in civil engineering in the 1929–1941
period. Exhibits highlighting these achievements, in partic-
ular the General Motors exhibit and Democracity, were the
standout attractions at the 1939–1940 New York World’s
Fair. See David Gelertner (1995). The last major suspension
bridge built in the United States was the Verrazano Nar-
rows, completed in 1964.
TABLE 3—COMPOUND ANNUAL AVERAGE GROWTH RATES
OF MFP IN THE TELEPHONE, ELECTRIC UTILITIES, AND
RAILROAD INDUSTRIES, UNITED STATES, 1919–1948
Telephone
Electric
utilities Railroads
1919–1929 1.60 2.51 1.63
1929–1941 2.01 5.55 2.91
1941–1948 0.53 5.87 2.56
Source: Kendrick, 1961, Tables G-III, H-IV, H-VI; pp.
544–45, 586–87, 590–91.
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new investment, but the full exploitation of new
blueprints for organizing residential subdivi-
sions and associated infrastructure tailored to
the automobile (Field, 1992, Table 2, p. 796).
The 1930’s witnessed qualitative and quanti-
tative changes in the nation’s infrastructure, as
well as its sources of funding. Ever since E.
Cary Brown’s 1956 article, it has been com-
monplace to downplay the significance of pub-
lic investment during the Depression as too
small in relation to GDP to have “made much of
a difference” in returning us to natural output.14
What this point of view obscures is the likeli-
hood that although insufficient in terms of its
influence on aggregate demand to compensate
for the drop in autonomous private spending,
public investment nevertheless had significant
impacts on the supply side.
A first step in reckoning the relative impact of
public sector capital on productivity growth in
different time periods is to consider the impact
on the residual growth rate of including in the
overall capital input series a portion of public
sector capital designated as complementary to
private sector production. If we follow Gordon
and adjust capital input to include both streets
and highway and GOPO investment, this further
widens the MFP gap between 1929–1941 and
1941–1948 in favor of the earlier time period,
because the increase in GOPO investment be-
tween 1941 and 1945 is significantly larger than
the drop off in street and highway building over
the same period (see U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis, Fixed Asset Table 7.5; lines 10, 28).
Although both types of government investment
were complementary to private sector produc-
tion, network effects and improved principles of
street layout contributed to MFP growth in the
1929–1941 period in a way GOPO investment
between 1941 and 1948 did not.
The BEA fixed asset stock data, which begin
in 1925, show very rapid rates of public invest-
ment in automobile-related infrastructure in the
second half of the 1920’s that continued largely
unabated through 1941. The real net stock of
streets and highway capital in the United States
increased by more than 2⁄3 between 1929 and
1948, with virtually all of this increase occur-
ring before U.S. entry into the war. Streets and
highways capital surged in value from 6.5 per-
cent of the net private fixed capital stock in
1929 to 10.7 percent in 1941, roughly the same
percentage recorded in 1973 (see Table 5).
Somewhat less dramatic patterns are seen for
public investment in water and sewer systems.
While spending on publicly owned capital has
figured heavily in debates about the significance
of declining infrastructure investment in the fall
off in productivity growth in the last quarter of
the century (David A. Aschauer, 1989; Edward
M. Gramlich, 1994), virtually no attention has
been paid to its role on the supply side in the
earlier period.
What is striking in retrospect about Depres-
sion-era technological progressivity is its broad
base, both within and outside of manufacturing.
In contrast, the most recent period of MFP
acceleration in the United States (1995–2003)
has seen advance narrowly concentrated within
manufacturing, within manufacturing within
durables, and within durables, within comput-
ers, software, and telecommunication (Gordon,
14 Thus the famous quote: “Fiscal policy ... seems to
have been an unsuccessful recovery device in the ‘thirties—
not because it did not work, but because it was not tried”
(Brown, 1956, pp. 863–66).
TABLE 4—COMPOUND ANNUAL AVERAGE GROWTH RATES
OF NET STOCK OF STREETS AND HIGHWAYS, SEWER, AND
WATER SUPPLY CAPITAL, UNITED STATES, 1925–2000
Street/highway
growth
Sewer capital
growth
Water supply
capital
growth
1925–1929 6.00 6.88 4.91
1929–1941 4.32 3.69 2.66
1941–1948 0.08 0.43 0.66
1948–1973 4.15 3.85 3.29
1973–2000 1.63 2.76 2.36
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Fixed Asset
Table 7.2 (http://www.bea.doc.gov).
TABLE 5—STREET AND HIGHWAY CAPITAL AS A PERCENT
OF THE NET FIXED PRIVATE CAPITAL STOCK,
UNITED STATES, 1929–2000
Street/highway
capital
Private
fixed capital
stock
As a percent of
private capital
stock
1929 $16,415 $253,987 6.46
1941 $30,861 $289,487 10.66
1948 $47,892 $582,248 8.22
1973 $290,389 $2,698,194 10.76
2000 $1,423,833 $21,464,786 6.63
Source: See Table 4.
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2000c; Steven D. Oliner and Daniel E. Sichel,
2000). Some additional MFP growth in IT-
using sectors such as wholesale/retail distribu-
tion and securities trading has also been
realized, but the magnitude of these effects re-
mains uncertain. It is striking that the estimates
we have for aggregate MFP growth during the
“New Economy” boom remain significantly be-
low those evidenced during the Depression.
VI. Alternate Interpretations of Rising Labor
Productivity in the 1930’s
The disastrous record of capacity and labor
force utilization in the Depression has overshad-
owed the comparatively high rate of MFP
growth over the same period. Many authors,
however, while failing to appreciate the record
of MFP advance, have nonetheless found it dif-
ficult to overlook evidence of rapidly rising
output per hour in the context of low rates of
capital formation during the Depression. In de-
veloping idiosyncratic explanations for this,
however, they have overlooked one that is more
straightforward.
In a recent survey, for example, Claudia
Goldin noted that nonfarm hourly labor pro-
ductivity “grew during the 1930’s at a rate
greater than that for the 1920’s” (2000, pp.
566 – 67).15 She attributes this trend to De-
pression-era cuts in hours per worker and the
probability that those unemployed were less
educated and “probably less skilled” than
those retained. Goldin’s interpretation, how-
ever, is emblematic of an ambiguity in the
labor economics literature involving whether
labor productivity is pro- or countercyclical.
Supporters of the view that it is countercycli-
cal, such as Goldin, adduce the hypothesis of
selective retention, whereas supporters of the
procyclical view emphasize labor hoarding.
The unresolved character of this debate rein-
forces the importance in calculating growth
rates of labor productivity of making compar-
isons between peaks in business cycles. Gol-
din is not entirely clear what intervals she has
in mind, but interpreting her statement liter-
ally implies looking at the years 1920 –1930
in relation to 1930 –1940.
None of these dates is a business-cycle peak.
As Table 6 shows, however, a peak to peak
comparison of 1941 with 1929 reveals the same
remarkable growth in output per hour. Goldin’s
selective retention mechanism cannot explain
the increase in labor productivity over this pe-
riod, since both 1929 and 1941 were years of
relatively full employment. Nor can this in-
crease be attributed to a rise in the capital-to-
labor ratio, since the fixed asset data show this
to be a period of capital shallowing. If the
numbers are right, the rapid growth in labor
productivity must be attributed, at least in an
accounting sense, to high MFP growth over
these years.
In contrast to Goldin, who emphasizes a
countercyclical tendency of labor productivity,
Ben S. Bernanke and Martin L. Parkinson note
sharp procyclical movements in manufacturing
productivity in ten industries over the 1929–
1939 period. But they reject ab initio the pos-
sibility that supply side shocks might have
played some role in producing this result: “we
believe that it is quite unlikely that the prepon-
derance of interwar cyclical variation (at least
during the 1930’s) was due to technological
shocks to the production functions of individual
manufacturing industries” (Bernanke and Par-
kinson, 1991, p. 441).
Within manufacturing, there is evidence that
the downturn differentially affected high- and
low-productivity firms, with a shakeout taking
place as the least efficient establishments were
culled out (Timothy F. Bresnahan and Daniel
M. G. Raff, 1991). This Darwinian mechanism—
a version of selective retention applied to
firms—may have reinforced the technological
trends I identify in contributing to measured
15 Her series splices data from Historical Statistics, Se-
ries D-684, with U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics data for
1947 onwards.
TABLE 6—COMPOUND ANNUAL AVERAGE GROWTH RATES
OF OUTPUT PER HOUR, PRIVATE DOMESTIC AND PRIVATE
NONFARM ECONOMY, UNITED STATES, 1919–1948
Private domestic
economy
Private nonfarm
economy
1919–1929 2.36 2.27
1929–1941 2.48 2.35
1941–1948 2.17 1.71
Source: Kendrick, 1961, Table A-XXII, A-XXIII, pp. 334–
35, 339–40.
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productivity growth between 1929 and 1941.
But Bresnahan and Raff limit the source of
productivity improvement to a between firm (or
plant) effect, much of which would have been
reversed with the return to fuller employment
before the war. I argue that the productivity
outcome, measuring peak to peak, was due to
more than temporarily losing the weakly per-
forming tail of the firm or plant productivity
distribution.
In a more recent paper, Harold L. Cole and
Lee E. Ohanian also note the rapid labor pro-
ductivity growth during the Depression years
(Cole and Ohanian, 2001). Their focus, how-
ever, is on the consequences of rising real
wages, whose causes they identify as institu-
tional. The National Industrial Recovery Act
and the effective continuation of its policies
after it was declared unconstitutional represent,
in their view, a significant governmentally in-
duced negative supply shock to the economy.16
Ironically, given that they write within the real-
business-cycle tradition, Cole and Ohanian do
not emphasize the possibility that a consider-
able portion of the upward wage movement was
in fact warranted by labor productivity im-
provement as a consequence of positive supply
shocks.17
In each of these instances, the authors’ char-
acterizations of the data (as opposed to their
explanations) are consistent with a set of pow-
erful supply shocks in the Depression years that
laid the groundwork not only for the remarkable
Allied victory in the war, but also for postwar
expansion. Profits, as well as wages, felt the
beneficial impact of this advance. Most of
the corporations occupying the commanding
heights of the economy, including RCA,
AT&T, IBM, Dupont, Alcoa, GM, Kodak, and
General Electric—companies that because of a
strong commitment to organized privately
funded research and development activity
(Mowery and Rosenberg, 1989, pp. 74–75)
were contributing disproportionately to MFP
advance—had returned to profitability well be-
fore the onset of World War II (Louis Galam-
bos, 2000, p. 947).
VII. Conclusion
At the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor, a very substantial fraction of 1948 pro-
ductivity levels had already been achieved.
Moreover, almost all of the foundations for
what W. W. Rostow (1960) would later call the
age of high mass consumption were already in
place. These included a growing public infra-
structure geared to automobiles and trucks, the
technical foundations and physical capital in-
vestments necessary for producing and distrib-
uting cheap petrochemicals, gasoline and
electric power, and a range of new and im-
proved materials and appliances that could take
advantage of these inputs. The high rates of
investment in street, highway, water, and sewer
capital literally helped paved the way for the
postwar suburbanization boom. In commercial
aviation, technical advance (the DC-3 was in-
troduced in 1936) as well as government invest-
ment in municipal airports during the 1930’s
had fostered a nascent industry with much room
for profitable expansion. The defining new
product of the third quarter of the century—
television—was on the verge of explosive com-
mercial exploitation. The Second World War
had relatively little to do with any of this.
The Depression years experienced exception-
ally high MFP growth rates partly as a result of
serendipity. Technical advances do not neces-
sarily arrive in a steady stream, and the 1930’s
were characterized by progressive programs in a
remarkably large number of industries and sec-
tors. The advances in chemicals, long distance
communication, electrical machinery, structural
engineering, and aviation proceeded largely in-
dependently of the Depression. Many of these
sectors relied upon and benefited from scientific
advance in a way nineteenth century industry
leaders often did not. This type of economic
progress was fostered by a system of privately
funded R&D labs that reached maturity during
this period, and operated during the 1930’s in a
fashion relatively undistorted by the subsequent
demands of the military. In other sectors, for
example railroads, the disruptions of financial
intermediation and very low levels of capital
formation associated with the downturn fostered
16 Its labor policies, including encouragement of the
right to organize, they see as persisting through the instru-
mentality of the Wagner Act. Encouragement of firms to
cartelize they see persisting, at least through the first Roos-
evelt administration, through lax antitrust enforcement.
17 Elsewhere I argue that the main obstacles to recovery
lay in construction, not, as they suggest, in the manufactur-
ing sector (Field, 1992).
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a search for organizational innovations that en-
abled firms to get more out of what they had.
Finally, government and university researchers
played an important role in helping to work out
and promulgate design principles for surface
transport and residential platting in an automo-
bile age.
The various papers discussed in the previous
section aim at reconciling otherwise anomalous
labor productivity data with the apparently di-
sastrous economic record of the Depression.
But the performance of the economy between
1929 and 1941 was not disastrous from the
standpoint of long-term growth. The reverse
was true. In spite of his many contributions to
our understanding of productivity trends, Ken-
drick led us astray by choosing 1937 as a ref-
erence peak in calculating productivity growth
in the 1930’s. If we use instead 1941, it is clear
that the bulk of the very rapid growth of MFP
between 1929 and 1948 took place before U.S.
entry into the war. Once this is recognized, labor
productivity growth during the Depression in
the absence of capital deepening ceases to be
anomalous, and the conclusion drawn from the
aggregate data finds strong support in microeco-
nomic studies of the timing of key innovations,
in sectoral studies of productivity change, and
in data on private sector employment and ex-
penditures on research and development. This
finding will require rethinking our understand-
ing of the broad contours and determinants of
U.S. economic growth in the twentieth century.
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